New book by Western Alum

Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology

• K. Brad Wray, State University of New York, Oswego

• Hardback

• ISBN: 9781107012233

• 3 b/w illus. 1 table

• Dimensions: 228 x 152 mm

• Not yet published - available from November 2011, Cambridge University Press
• $90.00 (C)

Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) has been enduringly influential in philosophy of science, challenging many common presuppositions about the nature of science and the growth of scientific knowledge. However, philosophers have misunderstood Kuhn's view, treating him as a relativist or social constructionist. In this book, Brad Wray argues that Kuhn provides a useful framework for developing an epistemology of science that takes account of the constructive role that social factors play in scientific inquiry. He examines the core concepts of Structure and explains the main characteristics of both Kuhn's evolutionary epistemology and his social epistemology, relating Structure to Kuhn's developed view presented in his later writings. The discussion includes analyses of the Copernican revolution in astronomy and the plate tectonics revolution in geology. The book will be useful for scholars working in science studies, sociologists and historians of science as well as philosophers of science.

K. Brad Wray is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the State University of New York, Oswego. His research addresses issues in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of social science. His papers have been published in a variety of journals, including Philosophy of Science, Synthese, Social Studies of Science, Scientometrics, and American Philosophical Quarterly.

Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, 1997.

Publications

 

(Forthcoming).  “Epistemic Privilege and the Success of Science,” Nous.

 

(Forthcoming).  “Rethinking the Size of Scientific Specialties: Correcting Price’s Estimate,” Scientometrics.

 

(Forthcoming: 2010).  “Kuhn’s Constructionism,” Perspectives on Science, 18: 4.

 

(Forthcoming: 2009).  “Did Professionalization Afford Better Opportunities for Young Scientists?,” Scientometrics.

 

2009.  “The Salaries of Italian Renaissance Professors,” Scientometrics, 80: 2, 351-357.

 

2009.“The Epistemic Cultures of Science and Wikipedia: A Comparison,” Episteme, 6.1: 38-51.

 

2008.“The Argument from Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti-Realism: A Defence,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 22: 3, 317-326.

 

2008.Kristina Rolin and K. Brad Wray.  “Social Empiricism and Science Policy,” Science Studies, 2/2008: 68-82.

 

2007.“Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited,” Synthese, 158: 1, 61-73.

 

2007.“Who has Scientific Knowledge?,” Social Epistemology, 21: 3, 337-347.

 

2007.“A Selectionist Explanation for the Success and Failures of Science,” Erkenntnis, 67: 1, 81-89.

 

2007.“Evaluating Scientists: Examining the Effects of Sexism and Nepotism,” in Value-free Science: Ideal and Illusions?, edited by Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, pages 87-106.

 

2006.“Scientific Authorship in the Age of Collaborative Research,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37: 3, 505-514.

 

2005.  “Philosophy of Science after Mirowski’s History of the Philosophy of Science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 36, 779-789.

 

2005.  “Rethinking Scientific Specialization,” Social Studies of Science, 35: 1, 151-164.

 

2005.  “Does Science Have a Moving Target?,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 1, 47-58.

 

2004.  “An Examination of the Contributions of Young Scientists in New Fields,” Scientometrics, 61: 1, 117-128.

 

2003.  “What Really Divides Gilbert and the Rejectionists?,” Protosociology, 18-19, 363-376.

 

2003.  “Is Science Really a Young Man’s Game?,” Social Studies of Science, 33: 1, 137- 149.

 

2002.“Social Selection, Agents’ Intentions, and Functional Explanation,” Analyse & Kritik, 1/2002: 72-86.

 

2002.  “The Epistemic Significance of Collaborative Research,” Philosophy of Science, 69: 1, 150-168.

 

2001.“Collective Belief and Acceptance,” Synthese, 129: 3, 319-333.

 

2001.  “Science, Biases, and the Threat of Global Pessimism,” Philosophy of Science, 68, (Proceedings), S467-S478.

 

2000.“Invisible Hands and the Success of Science,” Philosophy of Science, 67: 1, 163-175.

 

1999.  “A Defense of Longino’s Social Epistemology,” Philosophy of Science, 66, (Proceedings), S538-S552.

 

1999.  “The Role of Solidarity in a Pragmatic Epistemology,” Philosophia, 27:1-2, 273-286.

 

1997.“Rational Communities,” Perspectives on Science, 5: 2, 232-254.